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2Bank Oversight and the
Capital Structure of German Firms
Abstract
Pecking order theories predict that information asymmetries result in excess costs of, and thus
resistence to, outside versus inside finance.  Bank relationships should ameliorate information
problems, reduce cost differentials, and diminish reliance on internal funds and bank debt.  This
paper supports the pecking order hypothesis generally but finds little static effect of bank oversight
on firms= capital structure or use of bank debt.  Furthermore, bank-attached firms actually reduce
leverage more than independents in response to cash flow.  Thus, the findings cast doubt on the
standard perception of interlocking directorates as an important source of information or signals of
quality.
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According to the >pecking order hypothesis= of capital structure, corporations finance out of
retained earnings whenever possible.  Moreover, when funding needs exceed internal funds, firms
may forgo investment but prefer to issue debt rather than equity if they do turn to outsiders.1 Such
behavior arises because of information asymmetries between the sources and uses of external funds
generally, and because of the negative signals new equity in particular sends to potential investors.
More recent research has revived the older view that capital structure may vary
systematically among corporate firms and over individual firms= lifecycles.  Since availability and
quality of information vary from firm to firm, optimal capital structure should differ accordingly.
 Thus, the theoretical literature identifies several firm characteristics and circumstances that should
correlate systematically with the relative extent of debt and equity financing used as well as with the
choice between bank debt and bonds.  Firms with mild information-related problems may face low
relative costs of equity finance and may avoid the risk of having to match net operating returns to
fixed debt payments.
Optimal capital structure, because it depends on the accessibility and reliability of
information, may also vary due to the organization of financial intermediaries.  In particular,
institutions that facilitate access to information about firms may temper the problems that lead to
inefficient financing decisions.  The German financial system, for example, is long associated with
universal banking and close relationships between banks and firms; and many attribute importance
to the practice of bank representation on clients= supervisory boards as a conduit of information. 
Such bank oversight may lower the relative costs of and increase access to bank finance, so that
bank-attached firms may have higher leverage (with greater reliance on bank debt) than independent
4firms on average.
Another way interlocking directorates may be useful, however, is by equalizing information
between the operators of firms and those who provide securities-based finance.  If bank relationships
improve firms= ability to gain positive reputations in capital markets, then such involvement should
minimize the cost gap between debt and equity.  Firms may then reduce their leverage.  The fact that
German banks provide both investment banking and brokerage as well as commercial services
should further facilitate this adjustment.  In short, formal universal banking relations should speed
firms movement through the pecking order of financial instruments.
This paper investigates both the role of asymmetric information and the effects of bank
oversight in the patterns of German corporate capital structure at the start of the twentieth century.
 Germany is a useful case to study given that country=s long-standing adherence to universal,
relationship-based banking practices and the many hypotheses made about the benefits of such a
system.  The period prior to World War I is particularly important for a number of reasons:  it falls
close to the roots of the development of the modern German financial system, it coincides with a
period of rapid industrial investment and growth in Germany, and it predates the upheaval that
altered German economic and financial relations for much of the remainder of the twentieth century.
 Moreover, since new historical evidence supplements the already available modern data, such
research may expand the empirical testing grounds for theoretical findings on firms= financial
decision making.
The results indicate that information-based theories seem to apply to the German
industrialization context.  In particular, most hypothesized determinants of leverageBsuch as cash
flow and firm sizeBare also systematic predictors in the current sample.  Controlling for these other
factors, leverage also declines significantly over firms= life cycles.  The effects of formal bank
oversight, however, seem to be minimal.  Capital structure changes little with formalized bank
relationships.  Moreover, controlling for other firm attributes, attachment to a universal bank offers
no consistent speeding of firms= progress through the pecking order of financing modes but does
heighten firms= response to increasing cash flow.  Finally, a comparison of debt maturities reveals
no significant variation between bank-attached and independent firms in the relative use of short and
                                                                                                                                                            
1 On pecking-order behavior, see the study by Donaldson (1961) and the discussion by Myers (1984).
5long-term debt or in factors associated with that choice.  Thus, the results generally fall in line with
predictions of information-based theories of capital structure but undermine the traditional emphasis
on formal bank-firm relationships for ameliorating information problems, increasing access to bank
debt, and accelerating reputation-acquisition in capital markets.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief background on the theoretical
framework and some of the existing evidence.  Section 3 describes the data source and sample used.
 The empirical analysis proceeds in sections 4 and 5.  Section four evaluates factors correlated with
capital structure among firms in general, while section five assesses the additional impact of bank
oversight on corporate financing patterns.  Section 6 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
In a tax-free world with perfect competition, freely-functioning markets, and symmetric
information the choice among financial instruments has little consequence for firms.  Under such
conditions, Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved their now well-known proposition that firms cannot
alter the total value of their securities by varying the mix between debt and equity.  That is, capital
structure is irrelevant.  The stringent Modigliani-Miller conditions, however, rarely hold; 
consequently, optimal methods of corporate finance may vary systematically with firm
characteristics.
 Many theories of capital structure, most hinging on problems of asymmetric information and
agency problems, have appeared in the past several years.  In this literature, information and
preference gaps between firms (or managers) and potential investors create differences in the
desirability of various types of financing.  Because such problems are inherent in the use of any
outside funds, recourse to external finance may raise financing costs.  In the extreme,
internally-generated funds may constitute the only viable means of financing new investment.  Only
in the presence of mechanisms able to transmit credible information and ameliorate conflicts
between managers and investors is external finance viable. 
Firms seeking outside finance must then decide between debt and equity, and that choice is
based largely on the relative costs and benefits of the two instruments.  Earnings on debt are bounded
6above and thus cannot be improved by extra efforts firms might or might not make.  Equity returns,
in contrast, depend directly on firm valuation and therefore on the quality of managers, investment
opportunities, and the observability of returns.  Moreover, firms have the incentive to issue new
equity when insiders believe shares to be overpriced.  Such information problems theoretically lead
to the underpricing of equity and the rejection of worthwhile projects by existing shareholders. 
Consequently, in cases in which it is difficult to determine firms' worth (either ex ante potential or
actual outcomes), debt imposes lower information-related costs on firms and is preferred over
equity.2  Likewise, when the potential for managerial perquisites and overinvestment is high, debt
can increase managers= relative stake in the company and reduce the availability of funds available
for overinvestment.
Debt itself is a heterogenous category involving varying degrees of maturity, liquidity,
collateralization, intermediation, and monitoring.  As with the debt-equity tradeoff, inability to
credibly relay information to securities markets constrains firms' options (see Diamond, 1991, and
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).   Bank loans, because they are typically the most closely
monitored mode of finance, are usually seen as the first step to gaining a reputation for high quality
and efficient disposition of outside funds.  Such monitoring is thought to alleviate asset substitution
as well as under- and overinvestment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers,  1977, and Stulz, 1990).
 Compared to bonds, however, bank debt may impose additional costs that result from monitoring,
renegotiation, and the potential for rent-extraction due to the banks' access to proprietary
information.  Thus, firms may avoid bank financing when bond-issuance is feasible (see Rajan, 1992,
and Sharpe, 1990).
The profusion of theoretical models offers a wide array of implications that can be tested
empirically.  Theoretical models imply potential differences in capital structure among firms:  factors
that mitigate conflicts of interest and problems of asymmetric information tend to promote greater
use of outside finance and of equity in particular.  Thus, firm leverage is hypothesized to increase
with the extent of information asymmetry, liquidation value, managerial reputation, firm value,
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7default probability, and managerial equity ownership but to decrease with growth opportunities,
investigation costs, and the interest coverage ratio (see Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Despite a general lack of conflict among theoretical predictions, existing models yield
opposing results on the relationship of leverage to profitability and free cash flow.  In particular,
agency models suggest that leverage is positively associated with free cash flow but negatively
related to profitability.  The converse holds for asymmetric information-based models.  Such models
suggest that firms prefer to fund investment internally, cash flow permitting, than to resort to
external funds.  Empirically, however, free cash flow and profitability are often closely related, and
the difference often hinges on the commitment of firms to specified dividend payouts.  Thus,
dividends may also be a significant positive determinant of leverage (Baskin, 1989).
The pecking order hypothesis also suggests that financing decisions may change over the
firm=s lifecycle.  Often, quality and availability of information grows with the development of the
firm so that firms may experience fewer information-related problems as they become older, larger,
and have possibly established track records.  The fact that reputations take time to establish suggests
that mature firms should tend towards more equity in their capital structure relative to immature
firms.  That is, minimizing information problems reduces the cost gap between internal and external
funding and between debt and equity securities and thus alters firms= tradeoffs.
Monitoring is seen as key to many of the theoretical models of firm capital structure, and the
German financial system is thought to perform such tasks in a more direct way than its American
or British counterparts.  In particular, German banks often place their directors or managers on the
supervisory boards of client firms, and this representation is thought to improve both the banks=
insight into firms= investment opportunities and financial positions and the banks= control in
situations of conflict or distress.  Such positions may also provide signals of credit worthiness to
capital markets.  Moreover, German industrial banks, or universal banks, provide the full range of
financial services, from short-term lending on lines of credit to underwriting of bonds and equities.
The setup of the German financial system, therefore, may promote repeated interaction over the
firm=s lifecycle and the development of long-term relationships.
A natural implication of close bank-firm relationships, and a presumed motivation for them,
8is the amelioration of asymmetric information problems and accompanying distortions in firms=
financing decisions.  In general, the banks= superior information about affiliated companies might
lead to easier access to debt financing, and to bank debt in particular.  The easy observability of bank
membership in firms= boards, and the possible positive signal these positions may send, suggests that
bank-affiliated companies may also gain faster access to equity financing than independent firms.
 Such adjustment may be accelerated in the current context, because of regulatory limits on the
issuance of bonds.  The fact that the universal banks provide underwriting and brokerage of equity
shares, in addition to all kinds of debt services, should only speed such seasoning effects. 
It must also be acknowledged that bank board membership is probably at least partly
determined based on characteristics of the firms involved, and those firm-specific effects may relate
to the choice of financing instrument.  That is, bank affiliation may be determined simultaneously
with capital structure.  If bank-affiliated companies would have had unusually poor access to debt
financing, then attachment may only raise such companies to the levels of leverage experienced by
other firms.  By similar reasoning, affiliation may equalize firms= rates of progression through the
financial pecking order.  Given the universal structure of German banks, however, bank oversight
might equally arise because of a firm=s desire to issue equity.  Empirical evidence in this, and in other
studies, suggests that such selection bias is minimal.  For example, Fohlin (1997 and 1998) both
suggest that bank-attached German companies perform similarly to independent firms and are, if
anything, larger and more liquid.  Both types of firms also invest at comparable rates.  The current
study also shows that distributions of firm leverage and use of short- versus long-term debt are very
similar for attached and independent firms.
Not all theoretical predictions are easily tested, but a wide range of empirical work has
produced some interesting results.  Despite methodological differences, the clear consensus emerges
that leverage varies fairly consistently with certain firm characteristics.3 In particular, most studies
find that leverage increases with the tangibility of assets, investment prospects, and firm size and
decreases with volatility, likelihood of bankruptcy and profitability.  In addition, leverage is
associated with past dividend payouts and lagged values of leverage.
Though the empirical work so far tends to support capital structure theories based on
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9asymmetric information and conflicts of interest, direct evidence on the existence of a financial
pecking order is somewhat mixed.  In favor of the theory, leverage does seem to fall with firm profits
or cash flow (Baskin, 1989, Chaplinsky and Nichaus, 1993, and Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  Using
a different methodology, however, Helwege and Liang (1996) find that the probability of choosing
external financing is unrelated to internal cash and that greater information asymmetries do not
increase the propensity to issue debt.  Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) find that, in violation of the
pecking order, some firms with apparently poor investment prospects issue equity.   Their findings
support the agency model.  The current paper focuses on theories based on information asymmetry,
though these issues do not exclude the potential for agency costs as well. 
3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on a randomly-chosen cross-section of 320
German joint-stock companies in 1904.  This year is used for a couple of reasons.  First, interlocking
directorates between banks and industrial companies, though presumed to have played an important
role in the German industrialization, only became widespread in the last decade of the nineteenth
century.  Finding stable bank relationships requires choosing firms at the start of the twentieth
century.  The economic upheaval of the 1900-01 stock market crash and its aftermath provides
further justification for selecting firms slightly later in the industrialization period.  The use of a
cross section of firms, while forcing the common assumption that different firms represent one firm
at various stages of its development, eliminates problems of serial correlation and shocks (such as
stock market crashes or sudden inflation) that occur at varying points in different firms= lifecycles.
The data come from the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (HDAG)Ban annual
reference manual reporting on every German joint-stock company.  The HDAG gives balance sheets,
profit and loss statements, lists of supervisory and executive board members, as well as histories of
share capital, dividends, and share prices (for listed firms).  In most cases, the HDAG also
provides details of firms= origins, purposes, and important developments. 
The firms are all joint-stock firms, and thus have clearly accessed some equity finance. 
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However, many firms in this period were transformed into joint-stock companies while remaining
largely in the hands of their founders.  Thus, there is large variation in the extent of equity in the
firms= capital structure and the dispersion of ownership of that equity.  In addition, access to equity
for expansion and new investments may still depend on seasoning and reputation.
Various measures of leverage as well as tangibility of assets (fixed assets as a share of total
assets), investment prospects (typically measured by the ratio of market to book value of equity),
firm size (measured by the natural logarithm of sales), dividends, and profits all can be determined
from the information reported.  Of course, market-to-book value of equity can be calculated only for
firms with stock market listings, since they are the only ones to report share prices. 
Measures of leverage vary quite a bit in the literature on firm capital structure.  This paper
uses the ratio of debt to equity, both measured at nominal book values and taken directly from firms=
balance sheets.  Other definitions yield fundamentally the same results (see Appendix A for other
measures).  The distinction between debt and equity was clearer in the first part of the twentieth
century than it is today.  Thus, this paper ignores the question of hybrid securities.
German share companies use a dual system of corporate governance: the supervisory board
represents shareholders and appoints an executive board.  The latter is responsible for regular
company operations, while the former, at least in theory, controls major decisions of strategy and
investment.  Banks are thought to have gained superior oversight capabilities by placing bank
executive board members (managers) on the supervisory boards of firms.  Yet membership in
supervisory boards was not tied to share ownership; many bankers gained firm board seats without
any equity holdings.  Measuring formal oversight is fairly simple, since the data source reports the
boards of directors of the firms.  By matching the names of firm board members with those of the
principal universal banks, I create an indicator variable for this form of bank oversight.
Table I summarizes the variables used in the following analysis, broken down by bank
oversight category.  The last two columns contain the results of probit models, in which a binomial
indicator variable for bank oversight is regressed on the remaining variables of interest.  The figures
given are the change in probability of bank oversight given a one unit increase in the given
independent variable.  Sectoral fixed effects (included in column four but not in column three)
clearly influence the oversight decision, with bank board membership being almost ubiquitous in
11
some sectors and nearly absent in others. 
Leverage, firm age, and listing on the Berlin market provide some useful prediction of bank
attachment, though the first two effects are small.  An increase in the debt/equity ratio from the
overall sample mean of 0.64 to 1.00, for example, raises the estimated probability of bank oversight
by less than 5 percent.  Similarly, a decrease in firm age by one year (from the overall mean of 15.6
years) increases the estimated likelihood of bank oversight by one half of one percent.  The negative
prediction of age is due primarily to the existence of a handful of very old firms (over 35 years since
founding as a joint-stock company) in the unattached sample.  Listing in Berlin, though not in other
markets, causes the greatest increase in the estimated probability of attachment: moving from
unlisted to listed raises the estimated likelihood of bank attachment by 16 percent.  Market-to-face
value of shares (not reported) have a very small positive effect on the probability of bank oversight.
 Thus, while there are certainly some systematic differences between bank-attached and independent
firms, industry differences likely carry the greatest effect.
4. THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRM LEVERAGE
In line with the theoretical literature, and given the data available for the current sample of
firms, the first set of models estimates leverage as a function of fixed relative to total assets, the
natural log of income, net profits as a share of total assets, market-to-face value of common equity
shares, the age of the firm (since becoming a joint-stock company), and the existence of a listing on
the Berlin or other German stock exchange.  Fourteen sectoral indicator variables, also included,
control for industry fixed effects.  Since only roughly one third of the sampled firms had listings on
any stock exchange, the model is reported with and without the share price variable.
Because the dependent variable, leverage, is bounded below at zero, one might normally opt
for Tobit regression in this case.  In the current sample, however, a few firms have extreme values
of leverage, and it is difficult to deal with them in a Tobit regression, short of discarding them.  Thus,
I use robust regression, in which extreme values are downweighted using a variant of the Huber
limited influence estimator.  In the current sample, approximately six percent of the observations are
equal to zero; this fact reduces the potential for bias in OLS regression.  As a check on the sensitivity
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of the coefficients to the estimator used, however, I also estimate the models using Tobit and OLS
regression with extreme outliers removed.  Coefficient estimates and t-statistics for all three models
are very similar.4
The results for this sample (Table II) largely fall in line with those predicted by theory and
found in other empirical studies.  Tangibility of assets, as expected, relates positively to leverage,
though the coefficient estimates are statistically weak for all models.  Such findings suggest that, to
a small extent, the availability of collateralizable assets makes banks more willing to issue debt.  The
German system, because it is supposed to provide banks with superior knowledge of firms= quality
and potential, may reduce dependence on collateralBthus, predicting a weaker positive relationship
between tangibility and leverage.  Tangibility, however, is a strong positive indicator of leverage in
Germany in the 1980s (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Because larger firms tend to be more highly diversified and therefore present lower risks of
bankruptcy than small ones, firm size (natural log of income) is often hypothesized to relate
positively to leverage.  However, to the extent that size proxies for the availability of information
about the firm or the company=s reputation in equity marketsBand thus the firm=s ability to access
equity financingBleverage should relate negatively to size.  In the current context, size may be less
connected to the availability of information than it is to diversification.  Indeed, though statistically
weak in the base model, size coefficient estimates are positive and highly significant in all other
specifications; thus supporting the diversification explanation.
Different types of theories also make varying predictions about the relationship of leverage
to firm profits.  Pecking order models suggest that high-profit firms prefer to fund investment out
of retained earnings and therefore predict a negative correlation.  Banks= preference for lending to
profitable firms may induce a positive relationship; though if the resistence to debt is strong enough,
supply conditions may make little difference in equilibrium.  Agency models also indicate a positive
relationship between leverage and profitability, since managers may feel compelled to pay out large
dividends in order to placate shareholders.  This argument, however, hinges on the presence of
effective markets for corporate control, and that assumption is likely to fail in the German
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contextBespecially in the pre-World War I period.  The results here, consistently negative and highly
statistically significant coefficients of profits, strongly support asymmetric information theories (such
as the pecking-order hypothesis).
Equity share price is often used to measure the quality of investment prospects, but it may
also relate to a firm=s reputation in equity markets.  Since a strong past performance may encourage
share issuing rather than debt financing, market-to-book value of equity might actually be expected
to correlate negatively to leverage and may, therefore, fail to properly represent investment prospects.
 In the current sample, market-to-book value of equity relates negatively, but insignificantly, to firm
leverage.  Since the relationship is too weak to draw any conclusions, and since its exclusion
increases the available sample to 310 firms, the remaining regressions drop market-to-book value
of equity.
Including firm age, though absent from most empirical studies, addresses the question of
changes in capital structure over the life of the firm and offers further evidence on the validity of
information-based theories of capital structure.  When connected to theories of firm lifecycles, the
pecking order hypothesis suggests that firm leverage should decline as firms gain greater access to
and reputations in equity markets.  It is important to note that age in this context is the number of
years since formation as a joint-stock company.  Thus, this variable truly measures the time during
which the public has had at least some access to information about the firms in question.  Though
disclosure rules were weaker then than now, all joint-stock companies were required to publish an
annual balance sheet and were also included in such publicly available sources as the one used in this
study.  The current findings, consistently significant negative relationships between leverage and
firm age, support the information-based arguments. 
The final two specifications in this group include a binary variable indicating whether a firm
had a listing on the Berlin stock exchange or a listing on another German exchange (and not in
Berlin).  Such a variable is absent from the existing literature, mainly because modern studies
include only listed companies.  The omission may stem in part from the lack of data on unlisted
companiesBa problem that also exists for Germany both before 1895 and more recently.  The
variable provides another test of the proposition that information, or lack thereof, affects firms=
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financial structure. 
Firms with stock market listing are more likely to have had a broad and active market for
their securities and also distributed more information to potential investors.  These factors can be
expected to reduce information-related problems and increase firms= access to securities markets.
 In addition, gaining listing may increase ownership dispersion, and higher dispersion may reduce
shareholders= concerns about dilution from issuing new equity.  Thus, for a number of reasons, stock
market listing should be negatively associated with leverage.  In the current sample, a negative
relationship does emerge, and the finding can be interpreted as further indication of the importance
of information problems in choosing funding sources.  Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for the
>Berlin-only= indicator is larger and much more highly significant than the corresponding figures for
the >other-exchange= variable.  The difference in both coefficients and significance suggests that the
Berlin market offered greater access to equity capital than did the provincial exchanges.
In general, then, the current evidence lends further credence to the idea that asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders and between potential owners and managers has a
marked influence on the financing decisions of corporate firms.
5. THE EFFECTS OF BANK OVERSIGHT
The foregoing analysis offers only cursory insights into the impact of financial institutions
on firms= capital structure.  The question remains whether formalized relationships between banks
and firms plays an additional part in determining leverage.  Before evaluating more complex models
of capital structure, this part investigates absolute differences in leverage among firms with various
types of bank relationships.  Tables III and IV compare the debt-equity ratio for firms with and
without bank board representation.  Table III, showing several percentiles of the ratio as well as a
number of statistical tests for equality, indicates that companies with attachment to a universal bank
maintained somewhat higher leverage than those with no bank affiliation or attachment only to a
private bank.  The differences, however, are quite small over much of the distribution, and the
statistical tests of sample differences vary in their results. 
A simple t-test of the difference of means between firms with and without any bank director
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on their boards, as well as a one-way ANOVA test of means differences among the four attachment
categories, suggests that average leverage does vary somewhat.  Examination of broader evidence,
however, provides less convincing proof of such differences.  For all categories except provincial
bank attachment, approximately half of the firms had leverage of 0.5 or greater, and 20 to 25 percent
of firms had debt exceeding equity.  Firms with provincial bank attachments, though, fall into these
two categories at slightly higher rates (62 and 35 percent, respectively). 
Further comparisons of distributions offers confirmation of this rudimentary test.  The
Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test, a chi-squared statistic that tests the hypothesis that multiple samples come
from the same population, cannot reject the equality of the leverage distributions of attached and
unattached firms (p=0.19).  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic provides an additional test of
the equality of two distributions (Table IV).5 These tests reveal that firms with provincial-bank
attachments are largely responsible for apparent differences in capital structure, and that the
significance derives mainly from a relatively small number of firms with moderately high leverage.
 In contrast, the KS statistic indicates that the leverage distributions of firms with great-bank
attachments are not significantly different from those of all other firms (p=0.57).  The results of these
tests show that debt-equity ratios are distributed similarly, though not identically, for bank-attached
and independent firms.  Thus, in the absence of controls for other firm characteristics, bank
affiliation seems to have little generalized impact on firms= capital structure.
The findings so far indicate that firms generally behave in line with pecking order theories
of capital structure, and that formal bank oversight seems to alter static financing choices only
slightly.  A second set of models evaluates the impact of bank affiliations on firms= capital structure
while controlling for other determinants (Table V).  In particular, the new specifications include an
indicator for bank attachment and the interaction of that variable with the original independent
variables.  As in the initial models, firm size and tangibility of assets are both positively associated
with leverage, while profits, Berlin stock market listing, and age are negatively so.  Tangibility of
assets and listing outside of Berlin, as before, do not enter the regressions significantly.
Including bank affiliation variables yields some interesting results.  First, the new regressions
                                                
5 The KS and KW tests were implemented in Stata; the manual provides full details of the tests.
16
produce slightly stronger findings than the foregoing comparisons of firm leverage.  That is,
controlling for tangibility, size, profitability, and industry sector, bank attachment exerts a
significant, positive effect on leverage.  These results, however, are substantially diminished by the
inclusion of controls for firm age and fall below the 10 percent significance level with the inclusion
of the stock market listing variables.  Moreover, the reported specifications represent the strongest
results on the bank-attachment variable; coefficients and significance are only moderately robust to
changes in leverage definition or model specification. 
Surprisingly, further division of the bank-attachment variable into separate categories for the
three types of banks (private, provincial, and great), indicates that only the great-bank variable, if
any, enters the regressions significantly.6 Thus, despite the slightly higher average leverage of
provincial-bank firms, such attachment seems not to correspond to higher debt-equity ratios once
other factors are considered.
Two interaction effects offer potentially important insight into the question of bank influence
on capital structure.  First, the results show that profits is a much stronger negative correlate of
leverage for bank-attached companies than for unattached firms.  This finding suggests that, though
all firms decrease their debt or increase their equity in response to higher profits, those with banker
board members react more vigorously.  The negative relationship between profitability and leverage
is seen as evidence of asymmetric information between suppliers and demanders of capital.  A more
negative relationship might then imply poorer information availability, but bank-attachment is
usually assumed to ameliorate such problems not exacerbate them. Whether attached firms= behavior
results from constraints placed by bankers, or indicates a desire of managers to extricate themselves
from bank-controlled debt, is a question that requires further research.
Second, the new findings show that, though leverage declines with number of years as a
joint-stock company, bank attachment fails to accelerate this process.  Thus, if age represents the
seasoning of firms as well as increasing availability and accuracy of information, then these results
undermine the idea that banks= formal oversight speeds firms= progression through the pecking order
of financial instruments.  Indeed, since the coefficient of age interacted with bank attachment is
positive and larger than the negative coefficient for unattached firms, the findings actually suggest
                                                
6 Additional regression results using a four-choice bank-attachment indicator are available from the author.
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that bank-affiliated firms may move toward debt as they age.
The results clearly support pecking-order theories of finance, but show that bank attachment
may distort this effect.  The findings might be argued to support both positive and negative
interpretations of formal bank oversight.  While the results suggest that bank representation on firm
boards offers slightly greater access to debt, the results may also indicate that formal relationships
do not improve information flows outside of banksBthat is, in capital markets. 
An examination of debt composition throws a slightly different light on the issue of firms=
access to debt.  Though the HDAG reports only the type of securities issued, and not the funding
source, some inferences can be made about the prevalence of bank debt from maturities.  Long-term
obligations tend to consist of bonds and mortgages, while short-term debt includes bank advances
and credits from other companies.  Thus, the ratio of short-term debt to total offers insight into the
extent of bank lending in proportion to other forms of debt.  Short-term debt is particularly important
in the present context, since universal banks are thought to have used rolled-over current account
credits as a primary means of financing new investment during the German industrialization.  Such
loans, particularly when made on little collateral, can pose substantial risk to banks; board seats are
thought to offset part of that risk.
The results indicate a remarkable similarity in the use of short- versus long-term debt among
the sampled firms, regardless of attachment to a bank (Table VI).  Though the means and various
percentiles show a higher ratio of short-term debt among the great-bank firms than the other types,
several statistical tests indicate that such differences are highly insignificant.  Even a one-sided t-test
comparing the means of great-bank debt maturity with all others yields a p-value of 24 percent. 
Clearly then, bank-attached firms may use slightly more debt relative to equity, but they structure
that debt in much the same way as independent firms.
Rerunning the leverage regressions using only short-term debt confirms these findings (Table
VII).  In particular, short-term debt is statistically invariant to the presence of a banker in the firm
supervisory board.  Equations 2 through 4 in Table VII use three alternative definitions of debt
maturity and compare the results to those found for leverage overall (column 1 of Table VII repeats
column 3 of Table V).  The first two definitions of debt maturity, because they take short- term debt
as a ratio of either long-term debt plus equity or equity only, are the most comparable to the
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definition of leverage used in Table V.
The hypothesized determinants of capital structure enter similarly, but not the same, for
short- and long-term debt.  Size is still a significant positive indicator of short-term debt ratios, but
the effect appears to be smaller.  Likewise, both net profits and age are negatively associated with
short-term debt ratios, but the relationships are mostly much weaker than for the long-term ratio.
 Coefficients of both variables drop about two thirds in magnitude.  Thus, while the pecking order
seems to describe the choice between debt and equity, it appears to do less well in explaining the
choice between types of debt.  This relative lack of differentiation, however, may result from the
organization of German industrial banks.  Universal banks may have more information about firms
than would a specialized underwriter, since the bank likely also provides lending.  Thus, bonds and
bank debt may have greater complementarity in the universal system.
Interestingly, Berlin market listing remains a strong negative indicator of short-term debt
ratios, and listing on the provincial exchanges is also significantly negatively associated with short-
term debt.  This finding provides further evidence that listing does provide access to information,
though it is probable that firms wishing to issue securities are more likely to become listed in the first
place.  Causality, however, is not important, since the point is simply that there is a strong
connection between listing and securities issue.  Since provincial exchange listing is significant for
short-term but not overall leverage, the results also suggests that the provincial exchanges may have
been more important for bonds than they were for equity securities.
Of particular interest, bank oversight causes no significant changes in any of the determinants
of short-term debt ratios.  Thus, lack of bank board representation seems not to limit firms= access
to short-term debt.  This finding casts further doubt on the idea that bank board memberships
provided important monitoring of potentially risky short-term debt or systematically altered firms=
financing decisions.  It remains to be determined whether bank relationships simply increased access
to all kinds of financing, but the available evidence on investment patterns suggests not.7
It is still possible that the sources of short-term debt vary systematically with formal bank
oversight and that bank-affiliated companies gained priority access to funding from the banks placed
                                                
7 Fohlin (1998) shows that, in the first decade of this century, bank affiliated firms invested at similar rates as
independent firms and that bank board membership, controlling for selection bias, was not associated with lower
liquidity sensitivity of investmentBa common measure of firms= liquidity constraints.  See Edwards and Fischer
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on their boards.  The origin of funding should not matter, however, unless it affects the cost of
financing.  Such data are difficult to assemble for most firms, though the effects of higher financing
costs should appear in the quantity of financing used, the dependence of firms= investments on
internal funding, or the profits or rates of return of firms.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper offers a number of insights into the capital structure puzzle.  By demonstrating
that debt-equity ratios decline significantly with both age and profitability and increase with firm
size, the findings bolster recent theoretical work that emphasizes the importance of information
quality and availability in determining the mix of financial instruments. 
At the same time, the paper also shows that formalized bank relationships yield little static
effect on debt-equity ratios overall and especially on the use of short-term debt.  The fact that bank-
attached firms use short-term debt in similar proportions as do unattached firms and that bank
oversight alters none of the other determinants of short-term debt ratios suggests that affiliations are
not directly related to bank lending on rolled-over, and perhaps unsecured, lines of credit. 
On the contrary, this paper suggests that formal bank relationships, rather than speeding
firms through the financial pecking order as they age, may retard firms= progression from debt to
equity financing or even lead to slightly increased leverage over firms= lifecycles.  At the same time,
relative to independent firms, bank-attached companies move more rapidly away from debt in
response to increased cash flow.  Though appearances are suggestive, the inability to identify the
source of debt for most of the firms in the sample makes it difficult to determine whether this
behavior on the part of attached firms reflects a desire to extricate themselves from bank lending
whenever profits allow.  The fact that increased cash flow does not prompt attached firms to move
away from short-term debt (under which category bank debt would fall) tends to undermine such
an hypothesis.
Thus, the findings cast doubt on the standard perception of bank board representation as an
                                                                                                                                                            
(1994) on modern Germany.
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important source of information or market signals about firms= investment prospects.  The findings
here underscore the need for further investigation of firm investment and financing patterns in the
later stages of the German industrialization as well as more recently.  Problems of asymmetric
information clearly influence the funding decisions firms make.  If firms= capital structure impinges
on attainable levels or quality of investment, then it likely also affects the aggregate development
of industry and therefore economic growth.
The connection between information problems and the ultimate performance of the economy
highlights the potential importance of the financial system in industrial growth.  Financial
intermediaries provide information gathering and dissemination services, and the German banks,
because of their universal structure and supposed close links with industry, are believed in some
quarters to perform such functions more successfully than specialized intermediaries.  The results
of this paper, however, argue for a moderate assessment of the role of universal banks in the
financing choices of industrial firms.  Thus, this paper adds to the mounting evidence that the
particular organization of the German banks, especially the practice of formalized bank-firm
relationships, provide little generalized boost to German industry.
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TABLE I
SAMPLE MEANS AND CORRELATES OF BANK OVERSIGHT
Variable Bank oversight No bank
oversight
Probit 1 Probit 2
Debt/equity 0.88
1.01
0.63
0.64
0.07
0.12
0.12
0.02
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.56
0.24
0.60
0.24
-0.07
0.51
-0.11
0.40
Natural log of
Income
6.18
1.52
5.43
1.54
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.23
Net profits/
total assets
0.04
0.04
0.09
0.59
-0.58
0.38
-0.22
0.77
Market-to-face value of shares 167.22
74.44
149.65
64.07
Age of firma 13.76
9.73
16.49
12.69
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.07
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb 0.30
0.46
0.14
0.35
0.20
0.02
0.16
0.07
Listed on other German stock
exchange
0.22
0.42
0.17
0.38
0.11
0.12
0.10
0.23
p value of chi-squared test 0.00 0.01
pseudo-R2 0.09 0.12
Predicted probability
Observed probability
0.19
0.22
0.21
0.24
Number of firmsc 67
(33)
253
(66)
303 274
Note. Variables are computed using book values.  Standard errors are given in italics below means.
The dependent variable in the probit models is a binomial variable taking the value one when the firm has a
bank representative on its board and zero otherwise.  Probit 2 includes 14 industry indicator variables, while
probit 1 does not.  The probit results are the change in the probability of having bank oversight given an
infinitesimal change in the independent variable (or the discrete change from being unlisted to being listed in
the case of the two listing variables).  P-values of z-statistics (two-sided tests) for the probit model are given
in italics.  Eight extreme outliers are removed from the probit models using the Hadi multivariate selection
method. 
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company. 
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false. 
c The number of firms with share prices reported (market-to-face value of shares) is given in
parentheses below the number of firms in the sample overall.
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TABLE II
CORRELATES OF FIRM LEVERAGE
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.17
1.24
0.08
0.59
0.08
0.63
0.04
0.34
0.05
0.35
Natural log of
Income
0.04
1.44
0.07
3.50
0.08
4.10
0.09
4.56
0.09
4.53
Net profits/
total assets
-2.42
-2.90
-4.35
-8.97
-4.26
9.09
-4.44
-9.58
-4.44
-9.32
Market-to-face value of
shares
-0.00
-0.37
Age of firma -0.01
-2.85
-0.01
-2.67
-0.01
-3.08
Listed on Berlin stock
exchangeb
-0.16
-2.09
-0.25
-1.92
Listed on other German
stock exchange
-0.01
-0.17
-0.13
-1.04
Age x listed in Berlin 0.01
1.02
Age x listed on other
German exchange
0.01
1.34
Constant 0.23
0.94
3.87
8.57
3.99
9.13
0.60
2.95
4.05
9.08
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of firms 97 310 310 309 310
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of book values of debt to equity.  Regressions use a variant
of the Huber limited-influence estimator.  T-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics. 
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company. 
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false. 
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TABLE III
COMPARISONS OF LEVERAGE BY BANK-AFFILIATION CATEGORY
Statistic No banks Private Banks Provincial Banks Great Banks a
Mean 0.63 0.67 0.96 0.77
Smallest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.06
10 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.14
25 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.25
50 0.48 0.50 0.68 0.58
75 0.80 0.88 1.07 1.28
90 1.47 1.65 1.89 1.94
Largest 4.13 2.48 7.41 2.47
Number of firms 236 17 37 30
P(t): any versus no
bank
0.07
P(t): provincial
vs. great banks
0.42
P(oneway
ANOVA)
0.07
P(Kruskal-Wallis) 0.19
Note. Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity measured at nominal book values.  T-statistics result from
two-sided tests.  Kruskal-Wallis is a Chi-squared statistic testing if multiple samples come from the same
population.  Oneway ANOVA tests for differences among the means of several samples. 
a Great banks are the largest nine universal banks; provincial banks are all others.
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TABLE IV
TWO-SAMPLE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF LEVERAGE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
Any bank Provincial banks Great banks aD/E ratio
less than
Difference P-Value Difference P-Value Difference P-Value
1 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.49
2 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.62
5 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.56
no limit 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.57
Note. Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity measured at nominal book values.  P-values are for the
combined test that the given category=s distribution is greater or less than that of the omitted category and are
corrected based on an empirical continuity correction.  Difference refers to the largest difference in values of
the distribution. 
a Great banks are the largest nine universal banks; provincial banks are all others.
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TABLE V
CORRELATES OF FIRM LEVERAGE AND THE EFFECTS OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Bank board member 0.70
2.11
0.65
1.97
0.59
1.77
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.22
1.47
0.19
1.27
0.14
0.95
Bank x fixed assets -0.43
-1.58
-0.40
-1.48
-0.37
-1.37
Natural log of
income
0.05
2.50
0.07
3.16
0.08
3.46
Bank x income -0.01
-0.22
-0.03
-0.63
-0.03
-0.55
Net profits/
total assets
-2.82
-5.50
-2.80
-5.44
-2.91
-5.68
Bank x net profits -4.45
-2.94
-4.54
-3.00
-4.26
-2.82
Age of firma -0.01
-2.95
-0.01
-2.89
Bank board member x age 0.01
1.61
0.01
1.85
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb -0.14
-1.75
Listed on other stock exchange 0.01
0.16
Constant 0.49
2.28
0.55
2.53
3.95
8.83
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of firms 309 309 309
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of book values of debt to equity.  Regressions use a variant
of the Huber limited-influence estimator, and t-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics.
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company. 
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false. 
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TABLE VI
COMPARISONS OF DEBT MATURITY BY BANK-AFFILIATION CATEGORY
Statistic No banks Private Banks Provincial Banks Great Banks a
Mean 0.48 0.40 0.46 0.52
Smallest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07
25 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.20
50 0.41 0.32 0.35 0.50
75 0.98 0.57 0.94 0.85
90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Largest 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of firms 224 16 36 29
P(t): any versus no
bank
0.73
P(t): provincial
vs. great banks
0.53
P(oneway
ANOVA)
0.76
P(Kruskal-Wallis) 0.76
Note. Debt maturity is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt measured at nominal book values.  T-
statistics result from two-sided tests.  Kruskal-Wallis is a Chi-squared statistic testing if multiple samples come
from the same population.  Oneway ANOVA tests for differences among the means of several samples.
a Great banks are the largest nine universal banks; provincial banks are all others.
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TABLE VII
CORRELATES OF DEBT MATURITY AND THE EFFECTS OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Bank board member 0.59
1.77
0.09
0.82
0.11
0.80
-0.18
-0.45
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.14
0.95
-0.09
-1.77
-0.05
-0.89
-0.55
-2.51
Bank x fixed assets -0.37
-1.37
-0.12
-1.40
-0.17
-1.49
0.20
0.58
Natural log of
income
0.08
3.46
0.02
2.25
0.02
1.77
0.06
1.91
Bank x income -0.03
-0.55
-0.00
-0.13
0.01
0.31
-0.03
-0.47
Net profits/
total assets
-2.91
-5.68
-0.82
-4.95
-0.94
-4.46
-3.05
-3.94
Bank x net profits -4.26
-2.82
0.53
1.08
0.22
0.35
3.20
1.62
Age of firma -0.01
-2.89
-0.00
-1.41
-0.00
-1.60
-0.00
-0.35
Bank board member x age 0.01
1.85
0.00
0.23
-0.00
-0.21
0.01
1.14
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb -0.14
-1.75
-0.07
-2.83
-0.10
-2.82
-0.17
-1.67
Listed on other stock exchange 0.01
0.16
-0.04
-1.57
-0.06
-1.84
-0.15
-1.62
Constant 3.95
8.83
0.44
3.02
0.18
1.96
0.80
1.58
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of firms 309 310 309 228
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt to equity in equation 1, short-term debt divided by
all other debt plus equity in equation 2, short-term debt divided by equity in equation 3, and short-term debt
divided by long-term debt in equation 4.  All ratios use book values.  Regressions use a variant of the Huber
limited-influence estimator, and t-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics.
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company. 
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false. 
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APPENDIX A
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF LEVERAGE
Percentile Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3
Mean 0.33 0.34 0.35
Smallest 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.05 0.05 0.05
25 0.18 0.19 0.19
50 0.33 0.35 0.35
75 0.47 0.49 0.50
90 0.61 0.61 0.62
95 0.67 0.67 0.68
Largest 0.88 0.89 0.93
Number of firms 320 320 320
Note. Definition one is the ratio of outside liabilities (Fremdkapital) to total liabilities (including net
worth).  Definition two is the ratio of debt to the sum of debt, total share capital, and reserves.  Definition three
is the ratio of debt to the sum of debt, ordinary share capital, and reserves.
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APPENDIX B
CORRELATES OF LEVERAGEBTHREE ESTIMATORS
Variable Huber
Robust
Regression
Tobit with
Outliers
Removed
OLS with
Outliers
Removed
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.04
0.34
-0.08
-0.51
-0.07
-0.41
Natural log of
income
0.09
4.56
0.10
3.66
0.09
3.16
Net profits/
total assets
-4.44
-9.58
-6.91
-9.15
-6.35
-8.54
Age of firma -0.01
-2.67
-0.01
-2.29
-0.01
-2.38
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb -0.16
-2.09
-0.21
-2.17
-0.20
-2.06
Listed on other German stock exchange -0.01
-0.17
0.04
0.47
0.05
0.56
Constant 0.60
2.95
0.33
1.36
0.43
1.80
P(F-statistic, Chi-squared statitistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo-R-squared, adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.26
Number of firms 309 303 303
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of book values of debt to equity.  In columns two and three,
outliers are identified using the Hadi multivariate method.  T-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics.
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company. 
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false.
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